October 27, 2011
FORBES/Reilly On Indiana Property Tax Collection, Part II
In follow-up to the article cited in my October 21st post, Mr. Reilly's cleverly-titled article Indiana Property Tax Collection - We Need Jimmy Stewart is worth a look. (I was flatterred that he mentioned my blog in his piece.) Whether you're an owner/mortgagor or a lender/mortgagee, make sure real estate taxes are paid timely, paid before any tax sale or, at the very latest, paid before the tax sale redemption period. Otherwise, the consequences could be severe.
Posted at 02:30 PM in Tax Sales
October 21, 2011
FORBES Columnist Critical Of Indiana Tax Sale/Redemption Scheme
On October 19th, Forbes contributor Peter J. Reilly wrote a column about the potential hardships on Indiana property owners under the State's delinquent real estate tax redemption scheme. He titled his piece How To Sell Your Home To A Stranger For A Fraction Of Its Value. The September 28th Indiana Court of Appeals opinion in M Jewell, LLC v. Powell formed the basis of Mr. Reilly's column. Here is his conclusion:
I find that when I talk to a lot of people about different issues, many of them will reflexively indicate that either government or greedy business is the problem, depending on their ideological perspective. Other times people will trumpet the virtues of public/private partnerships. The collection of real estate taxes by auctioning off liens and tax deeds appears to have the potential of being a toxic mixture of the worst aspects of government and business. Clearly it helps local governments keep overhead down, which is a good thing, but at least in Indiana, it appears that there needs to be some greater protection for hapless homeowners.
Jewell is an interesting and educational case for mortgagees, mortgagors, tax sale purchasers and real estate lawyers. For more background on the law and related issues regarding Indiana tax sales, and how they affect secured lenders, please review my two posts on the subject from last November.
Posted at 10:29 AM in News
, Tax Sales
October 07, 2011
Indiana Supreme Court Speaks To The Doctrine Of Merger And The Remedy Of Strict Foreclosure
The doctrine of merger and the remedy of strict foreclosure have been hot topics in Indiana’s appellate courts over the last couple of years. The development of the law has centered upon two cases: Deutche Bank v. Mark Dill Plumbing and Citizens State Bank of New Castle v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. In 2009, I posted four articles about Deutche Bank: April 17, April 24, May 4 and July 20. In 2010, I wrote about Citizens State Bank. Earlier this year, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Citizens State Bank and issued its own decision, seemingly closing the books for the foreseeable future on this area of the law (.pdf) . The subject – big picture – relates to the impact of a foreclosing mortgagee’s failure to include a junior lien holder in a foreclosure case.
At issue. I outlined the key facts of the Citizens State Bank in my September 20, 2010 post. The Supreme Court distilled the dispute to its essence:
A mortgage holder foreclosed its mortgage, took title to the subject property at a sheriff’s sale, and then sold the property to a third party. The foreclosing mortgagee subsequently discovered it had inadvertently failed to name a junior lienholder in the foreclosure action. We granted transfer to shed light on the status of the original first mortgage in this context.
Merger. On pages 3 through 5 of the opinion, the Court provides an excellent discussion of Indiana’s doctrine of merger, including an explanation of the “equity of redemption.” The idea of “merger,” as noted by the Court, typically means that the mortgagee, in a foreclosure, acquires both the lien and legal title to the real estate so as to “merge” those two interests. That is, “the mortgage merges with the legal title, and the lien is thereby extinguished.”
Strict foreclosure. As suggested in the line of Deutche Bank’s cases, in my opinion the remedy of strict foreclosure (forfeiture, really) technically doesn’t exist in Indiana, even though lawyers and lenders frequently use that terminology. Here’s what the Indiana Supreme Court said about the remedy as it applied in Citizens State Bank:
But there is nothing particularly sacrosanct about a strict foreclosure action. That is to say, simply alleging that strict foreclosure would be a proper remedy does not make it so, nor does such allegation resolve the question of merger. In the end strict foreclosure as used in this case is merely a mechanism to place before the court the question of whether the doctrine of merger should be enforced.
Presumption. Regarding the enforceability of the doctrine of merger, the Court stated:
As indicated earlier in this opinion our case authority declares, “[w]hether the conveyance of the fee to the mortgagee results in a merger of the mortgage and the fee depends primarily upon the intention of the parties, particularly that of the mortgagee.” This is not, in our view, an “anti-merger” rule. Instead, we view it simply as an exception to the [merger] rule, providing a starting point in determining whether merger occurred in the first instance.
The “presumption” is that a mortgagee intends to do that which is most advantageous to itself. But the presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by evidence showing “that a merger had been expressly agreed to, or that the mortgagee’s conduct and action were such as could fairly be ascribed only to an intention to merge.” In basic terms, the question is whether the parties desired to extinguish the mortgage lien.
Holding. The Court ultimately found that the evidence in Citizens State Bank rebutted the presumption that the mortgagee wanted the two estates (mortgage and title) to remain separate. The Court focused on the limited warranty deed that transferred the property to the third party, FNMA. “Countrywide’s intent was manifest: conveyance of title in fee simple, free of all encumbrances.” The Court reasoned that “simply because in retrospect it might not have been in Countrywide’s ‘best interest’ to extinguish its mortgage lien when it conveyed the property to FNMA cannot change Countrywide’s intent after the fact.” The Court held that the third party, FNMA, acquired the property subject to the valid judgment lien. (This result may have been prevented had the mortgagee and FNMA used the “anti-merger” language typically used in deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure.)
Not always. The Court noted that there may be circumstances under which the equitable remedy of strict foreclosure (actually quiet title relief, in my view) still may be appropriate. Certainly a mortgagee’s intent is of primary importance. An example of this would be a case in which a junior lien was not joined in the foreclosure action due to an indexing error that prevented the lien from appearing in court records. Under the facts of Citizens State Bank, however, the record was clear that the junior lien on the real estate was properly recorded and indexed, and the lien simply was overlooked due to the senior mortgagee’s mistake and/or inadvertence.
Citizens State Bank is another one of those decisions that drives home the point that an owner’s policy of title insurance is a wise investment for foreclosing lenders.
NOTE: Legislation in 2012 impacted these issues.
Posted at 03:48 PM in Mortgages
, Strict Foreclosure
September 23, 2011
Indiana Supreme Court Rules On Scope Of Trial Court's Authority In Proceedings Supplemental
This is a continued report on the pair of Branham cases, which have moved their way from the Perry Circuit Court to the Indiana Court of Appeals and most recently to the Indiana Supreme Court. The cases deal with proceedings supplemental and garnishment, and they were the subject of my July 14, 2011 post "Indiana Trial Court Oversteps Its Authority In Proceedings Supplemental."
The Indiana Supreme Court handed down its decisions in the two matters on August 30, 2011: .pdf1 and .pdf2. This means that the two opinions cited in my July 14th post have been vacated. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals with regard to (1) the reversal of the trial's court's order requiring the judgment debtor to seek employment or to seek better employment and (2) the upholding of the trial court's order for the judgment debtor to return to court for status checks "some limited number of times."
But the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court's decision requiring the judgment debtor to pay $50 per month toward the judgment. "For unrepresented parties in small claims court, resort to the generic exemption statute and the Social Security exemptions are not forfeited even if the litigants do no know enough to plead them."
Again, the Branham opinions provide a good explanation of the purpose and scope of proceedings supplemental and garnishment, and they provide insight into the rights and remedies associated with a secured lender's effort to collect a deficiency judgment.
Posted at 05:21 PM in Attachment/Garnishment
, Proceedings Supplemental